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Buddhist Error Theory 
Abstract: Few philosophers have systematically examined what Buddhist commitments imply for 
metaethics. In this paper, I explore the status of normative reasons in Buddhist philosophy. 
I argue that Buddhist commitments entail an error theory about normative reasons. But I also 
make the case that this is a defensible position. I show that the Buddhist argument for error 
theory is plausible and that Buddhist error theory can overcome key objections, such as the 
objections that Buddhist error theory is incoherent, self-defeating, unbelievable, and 
incompatible with prominent schools of Buddhist philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that Buddhist 
error theorists can accommodate Buddhist ethical commitments if they adopt fictionalism about 
normative reasons. 
 
1. Introduction 
Pretty much everyone agrees that reasons exist. We think that we have reasons for action, 
belief, or attitudes. For example, I have reason to care for my children, to take antibiotics to stave 
off a dangerous infection, to feel afraid if a tiger is chasing me, and so on. These reasons are 
normative. Normative reasons explain why we ought to perform certain actions or adopt certain 
beliefs and attitudes.  
Here’s a question that’s seldom asked: how do normative reasons fit into Buddhist 
philosophy? While there’s been a growing interest in Buddhist metaethics in recent years, the 
discussion remains preliminary.1 Few philosophers have systematically examined what Buddhist 
commitments imply for metaethics. But some authors suspect that Buddhism is unable to make 
sense of normative reasons. Throughout its long history, Buddhism’s critics have alleged that 
Buddhist principles entail nihilism. In recent years, Dan Arnold has developed a sophisticated 
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version of this argument.2 Buddhist epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti hold that only causally 
efficacious entities are real. Yet Arnold claims that reasons don’t have causal powers. So, 
Buddhist philosophers are committed to the view that reasons are unreal. But, if Buddhist 
philosophy lacks the resources to make sense of a “logical space for reasons,” then Buddhism 
faces problem of incoherence and self-defeat. If there are no reasons, then there are no reasons to 
believe Buddhism. Furthermore, Arnold suggests that it’s impossible to rationally believe that 
there are no reasons. So, we should reject at least certain influential positions in Buddhist 
philosophy that entail these problematic claims about the nature of reasons. 
In this paper, I’ll examine the status of normative reasons in Buddhist philosophy. I’ll 
argue that Buddhist commitments do in fact entail an error theory about normative reasons. But 
I’ll also make the case that this is a defensible position. I’ll show that the Buddhist argument for 
error theory is plausible and that Buddhist error theory can overcome the objections that Arnold 
and other critics raise against it. I’ll proceed as follows. In section 2, I’ll explain why Buddhist 
commitments entail error theory about reasons. In sections 3 and 4, I’ll respond to a range of 
objections, such as the objections that Buddhist error theory is incoherent, self-defeating, 
unbelievable, and incompatible with Mādhyamika Buddhism. In section 5, I’ll suggest that 
Buddhist error theorists should endorse fictionalism about normative reasons. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. A Buddhist Error Theory About Normative Reasons 
Consider the following claims: 
(1) The fact that a medication is necessary for my survival is a reason for me to take 
this medication.  
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(2) The fact that donating to charity would reduce the suffering of others is a reason 
to donate to charity. 
(3) The fact that there’s strong evidence that climate change is happening is a reason 
to believe that climate change is happening.  
(4) The fact that Oskar Schindler risked his own life in order to save the lives of Jews 
during the Holocaust is a reason to admire him. 
Claims (1-4) are rather plausible. I’ll refer to claims like these ones as “reason claims,” claims 
about the reasons that you and I have to do, feel, or believe. These reasons are normative 
reasons, not descriptive ones. Normative reasons justify actions and attitudes. They explain why 
we ought to perform certain actions or adopt certain attitudes. 
A global error theory about reasons says that all reason claims, such as (1-5), are false. 
According to this error theory, there are no normative reasons. I’ll now argue that Buddhist 
commitments entail a global error theory about reasons. My argument begins with the premise 
that there are two ways of understanding the nature of normative reasons: reductionism and non-
reductionism. I’ll briefly clarify these views and then argue that both of them lead to error theory 
when combined with Buddhist principles. 
Reductionism about reasons holds that reasons are reducible to some other non-normative 
property. The most popular candidates are psychological states of some kind, such as desires and 
attitudes. On this view, reasons are explained by a person’s psychology. Roughly speaking, a 
person’s reason to phi is constituted by her desires, attitudes, and beliefs. Suppose that Coraline 
has a reason to help her friend Sarah move to a new apartment. Coraline’s reason to help Sarah 
move just consists in, or is explained by, her attitudes and desires. Perhaps Coraline likes Sarah 
and feels affection for her. Her affection for Sarah explains, at least in part, why she has reason 
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to assist Sarah. Or consider another example. Assume that Leticia loves to dance, and she’s been 
invited to a party tonight where there will be dancing.3 Leticia has a reason to go to the party in 
virtue of the fact that she loves to dance. So, a descriptive fact about Leticia’s psychology (her 
desire to dance) explains a normative property (her reason to attend the party). 
Mark Schroeder suggests that the relationship between reasons and psychological states 
is constitutive in nature.4 Consider a square. A square is constituted by four lines arranged in a 
certain way. This arrangement of lines constitutively explains the properties of the square. 
Similarly, Leticia’s psychological states are constitutive of his reason to attend the party. These 
states just are what it is to have a reason to go to the party. In this sense, reasons are fully 
reducible to, or explained by, non-normative properties.  
Let’s now consider non-reductionism about normative reasons (philosophers often refer 
to non-reductionism about reasons as “non-naturalism”). Non-reductionists deny that reasons are 
identical with any descriptive or non-normative properties. Rather, normative properties are sui 
generis. These properties are fundamental favoring relations between facts and actions, attitudes, 
aim, or belief. These relations are basic and irreducible—we’re unable to analyze the concept of 
a reason in terms of other concepts, such as beliefs or desires. Imagine that Timothy is walking 
along one day and notices a child drowning in a pond. Timothy lacks any desire to save the child 
whatsoever. A reductionist about reasons may need to concede that Timothy has no reason to 
save the child. After all, Timothy’s has no desire to save the child. Yet a non-reductionist can 
still say that Timothy does have a reason to save the child. This is so because reasons are 
irreducible to descriptive properties. Thus, there might still be irreducible normative reasons in 
favor of Timothy’s saving the child. In this way, a non-reductionist can claim that we’re unable 
to escape our moral reasons by jettisoning our desires. 
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There are many different varieties of reductionism and non-reductionism about normative 
reasons. But I take the dichotomy between reductionism and non-reductionism to be exhaustive. 
Either we can give reasons a reductive explanation or they’re irreducible. I’ll now argue that 
Buddhists should reject the existence of both irreducible and reducible reasons.  
Let’s start with irreducible reasons. Here’s my argument for why Buddhists must deny 
the existence of irreducible normative reasons: 
1. Irreducible normative reasons lack causal efficacy. 
2. The only entities that exist have causal efficacy. 
3. Thus, irreducible normative reasons don’t exist. 
Consider the first premise. Irreducible reasons are similar to other abstract objects, such as 
universals and mathematical objects. Notice that mathematical objects don’t seem to have causal 
properties. The number 2 never comes into causal contact with other objects. The number 64 
never bumps into 56. Mathematical objects are causally inert.5 The same goes for universals. We 
can’t touch or hold the universal property “redness” or “wetness.” We can only interact with 
particulars or instantiations of universals. 
Like other abstract properties, irreducible normative properties are causally inert. Why 
exactly? Non-reductionists about reasons believe that reasons are robustly mind-independent. 
They exist independently of what we happen to think or feel. This is why non-reductionists can 
say that Timothy has a reason to save the child even though he has no desire to do so. But, if 
reasons are robustly mind-independent, then it’s false that reasons causally depend on our 
attitudes or judgments. In fact, they never causally interact with us at all. Defenders of non-
reductionism accept these claims. David Enoch says that “normative truths are causally inert.”6 
Thomas Scanlon rejects the view that we acquire knowledge of normative truths by causally 
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interacting with them.7 Derek Parfit denies that normative truths “exist in space or time.”8 If 
reasons don’t exist in space or time, it’s hard to see how they could have causal properties. So, 
proponents of non-reductionism agree that irreducible normative reasons lack causal powers. 
Yet Buddhist philosophers think that only entities that have causal powers exist. Buddhist 
philosophers affirm the causal efficacy criterion for real entities.9 According to this principle, all 
real entities have causal efficacy. The Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti famously describes 
this principle as follows: “Whatever has causal powers (arthakriyāsamartha), that really exists 
(paramārthasat) in this context [i.e., when we examine reality]. Anything else is declared to be 
[just] customarily existent (saṃvṛtisat)…”10 Mark Siderits says that the causal efficacy criterion 
is “the pan-Buddhist position.”11 The causal efficacy criterion is also closely related, or perhaps 
even equivalent to, the doctrine of dependent origination, which holds that everything is subject 
to causes and conditions.12 If everything is subject to causes and conditions, then it follows that 
everything that exists has a causal backstory. The causal efficacy criterion rules out the existence 
of universals and other abstract objects, and explain why Buddhist epistemologists accept 
nominalism.13 So, core Buddhist commitments are incompatible with non-reductionism about 
reasons. If the causal efficacy criterion is true, then everything that exists has causal capacities. 
Yet irreducible normative properties lack causal powers. Thus, Buddhists must conclude that 
irreducible normative reasons are unreal. 
Buddhists are unable to accept irreducible normative properties. But what about 
reductionism? Buddhists must also reject the reality of reducible normative reasons. Here’s my 
argument for this conclusion: 
1. If normative reasons have a reductive explanation, then reasons are composites. 
2. Composites ultimately don’t exist. 
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3. So, if normative reasons have a reductive explanation, then normative reasons 
ultimately don’t exist. 
The first premise of this argument is just a straightforward entailment of reductionism about 
reasons. Remember that, if reasons are reducible to non-normative properties, then reasons are 
composed of, or constituted by, psychological states such as desires, beliefs, or attitudes. So, in 
this sense, reasons consist in psychological states. Entities that have constituents or components 
are composites. Consider a car. A car is a composite entity. It has parts: a motor, tires, a frame, 
and so on. If reasons are constituted by psychological states or dispositions, then reasons are 
composites as well. We can reduce reasons to their more fundamental constituents. 
 The controversial premise in the argument is the second one. This premise is 
mereological nihilism, the view that composites lack reality. While mereological nihilism is a 
controversial position, most Buddhist philosophers accept it.14 We can trace the origins of 
mereological nihilism in Buddhism to the Buddha’s arguments against the self. The Buddha 
contends that we can decompose persons into five skandhas or constituents: feelings, corporality, 
perceptions, volitions, and consciousness. None of these skandhas is a suitable basis for the self. 
So, we should conclude that the self lacks reality.15 The logic of this argument suggests that, once 
we reduce a whole to its components, the whole may not exist. 
Early Buddhists, such as the author of Milinda Pañha, further developed this style of 
argument.16 In this text, the Buddhist monk Nāgasena argues that chariots and persons are unreal 
because they’re composite. Nāgasena claims that the word “chariot” is a mere convenience 
designator for a collection of parts, such as wheels, spokes, a hub, and so on. Similarly, the word 
“person” is a convenience designator for a series of psychophysical elements. Buddhists in the 
Abhidharma tradition explicitly endorse mereological nihilism in arguing that reality consists in 
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bundles of momentary tropes like shape and color. The composite entities that tropes constitute 
are unreal—only the underlying tropes exist.17 While Mahāyāna philosophers disagree with other 
Buddhists in various ways, many of them agree that composite entities don’t exist. For example, 
mereological nihilism seems to underwrite Candrakīrti’s rejection of the self in 
the Madhyamakavatara.18 
Why accept mereological nihilism? I’ll only briefly sketch some of the considerations in 
favor of it here.19 One important argument is the “neither identical nor distinct” argument. This 
argument begins with the assumption that, if wholes exist, then wholes are either identical with 
their parts or distinct from their parts. Both options lead to trouble. Consider the first option, the 
claim that wholes are identical with their parts. The problem with this claim is that wholes and 
parts have distinct properties. A whole is one, while the parts are many. So, if wholes and parts 
have different properties, then the indiscernibility of identicals rules out the possibility that 
wholes are identical with their parts. Now consider the possibility that wholes are distinct from 
their parts. The problem with this option is that the properties of the whole seem reducible to the 
properties of its parts. Take the chariot example again. To understand how a chariot works, we 
only need to understand the properties of a chariot’s parts, and their relation with one another. 
The whole “chariot” lacks any causal powers that we’re unable to trace back to the chariot’s 
components. This suggests that the whole chariot isn’t actually distinct from its parts. And, if 
wholes fail to do any explanatory work, then it’s unnecessary to postulate that wholes exist. 
Therefore, wholes are neither identical nor distinct from their parts. It follows that wholes are 
unreal. 
Another influential argument for mereological nihilism appeals to sorites problems for 
composite objects. Here’s an example. There’s a coffee mug in front of me. Now, suppose that I 
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remove a few of its atoms. The coffee mug is still there. Suppose that I remove a few more atoms 
from mug, and I repeat the process again and again. At some point, the coffee mug is gone. 
When exactly did that happen? There’s no non-arbitrary answer to this question. Instead, there’s 
vagueness about when the coffee mug neither exists nor doesn’t exist. So, the coffee mug is a 
vague object. Yet vague objects are unreal. It’s false that vagueness exists in the world. 
Therefore, the coffee mug is unreal. If that’s true of the coffee mug, then it’s also true of 
composite objects in general. Thus, to avoid metaphysical vagueness, we should conclude that 
composite objects don’t exist. 
My aim here is not to defend mereological nihilism.20 Instead, my point is merely to 
explain why Buddhist philosophers accept it. Buddhist philosophers believe that wholes are mere 
conceptualizations. They’re ways that we think and use concepts. Yet wholes don’t exist in 
reality. Wholes are reflections of our cognitive interests, dispositions, and imputations. And, if 
wholes lack reality, then it’s false that reducible reasons exist. Reducible reasons are composites. 
Thus, given mereological nihilism, reducible reasons don’t exist. So, Buddhists should hold that, 
if reasons are reducible to constituent components, then they ultimately lack reality. 
We’ve now arrived at the conclusion that, according to Buddhists, reasons are unreal. 
Here’s the complete argument: 
1. Either normative reasons are reducible or irreducible. 
2. If reasons are irreducible, then they lack causal efficacy. 
3. The only entities that exist have causal efficacy. 
4. So, if reasons are irreducible, then they don’t exist (2, 3). 
5. If normative reasons are reducible, then reasons are composites. 
6. Composites ultimately don’t exist. 
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7. So, if reasons are reducible, then they don’t exist (5, 6). 
8. Therefore, reasons don’t exist (1, 4, 7).21 
In other words, Buddhist commitments entail an error theory about normative reasons. The error 
theory is a claim about ultimate reality. Ultimate reality refers to what the world is really like or 
the fundamental furniture of the universe independent of our theorizing about it.22 From this 
perspective, there are no reasons. 
 Let me be clear about what I take this argument to accomplish. My aim in this section is 
to show that key Buddhist philosophical principles entail error theory about normative reasons. 
I’m not going to fully defend the premises of this argument here. For example, I’ll refrain from 
arguing that the causal efficacy criterion or mereological nihilism is true. An adequate defense of 
these premises is well beyond the scope of this paper. For my purposes here, it’s enough that 
most Buddhist philosophers endorse these premises. While I’ll avoid offering a full-fledged 
defense of this argument, I’ll defend it in a way. I want to show that Buddhist error theory is a 
serious view, and one that we’re unable to easily dismiss. Indirectly, this will amount to a 
defense of Buddhist principles. For if Buddhist principles entail the error theory and the error 
theory is false, then there’s something wrong with Buddhist principles. On the other hand, if 
error theory is defensible, then Buddhist principles may be defensible as well. In what follows, 
I’ll consider various objections to Buddhist error theory and show how we can rebut these 
objections.  
 
3. Incoherence, Self-Defeat, and Unbelievability 
One objection to Buddhist error theory is that this view is incoherent or self-defeating. 
Dan Arnold suggests this objection. Arnold’s argument goes like this. Arnold is criticizing 
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Dharmakīrti, the influential Buddhist philosopher from the sixth or seventh century C.E. 
Dharmakīrti accepted the causal criterion of reality according which only things that have causal 
efficacy are real. Arnold thinks that this commitment has objectionable implications. This is so 
because reasons are irreducible to entities with causal efficacy. In the words, Arnold seems to 
believe that, if reasons exist, then they must lack causal efficacy. But, if Dharmakīrti is right that 
the only reals have causal efficacy, then this implies that reasons don’t exist. 
Yet it’s incoherent or absurd to argue that reasons don’t exist. Why? Arnold writes that 
“it is…a condition of the possibility of arguing so that the space of reasons already be in play” 
and that “it seems [Dharmakīrti] would therefore be…vulnerable to the argument that reason’s 
being ‘practical’ is not, in fact, something that can coherently be denied, insofar as it is only in 
terms of reasoning that such a denial is even intelligible.”23 Arnold is arguing that it’s incoherent 
to claim that reasons are unreal. His argument seems to be that you could only arrive at the 
conclusion that reasons are unreal through reasoning. You need to assume that reasons exist in 
order to engage in reasoning. This assumption is inconsistent with the claim that reasons are 
unreal. So, error theory is incoherent.  
 At first glance though, it looks like the error theory is coherent. Consider the following 
two claims: 
(5) The error theory is true. 
(6) There’s no normative reason to believe the error theory. 
Claim (5) entails claim (6). If the error theory is true, then there’s no reason to believe it. 
Furthermore, claims (5) and (6) are consistent with each other. It seems possible that some 
claims are true despite the fact that you have no reason to believe them. Here’s an example. 
Suppose that I declare to you that Goldbach's conjecture is true. But I decline to offer any proof 
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for this claim. Everything else being equal, you lack any reason to believe that Goldbach's 
conjecture is true. Nonetheless, it could still be true. The same point holds for error theory. Error 
theory could be true even though I have no reason to believe that that’s the case. So, on the 
surface, error theory appears to be coherent.  
 But this may misunderstand Arnold’s complaint. Perhaps his complaint is not that error 
theory itself is incoherent. Instead, maybe his claim is that arguing for the error theory involves 
an incoherence. To defend error theory, you must offer reasons for believing error theory. Yet to 
engage in the practice of offering reasons is already to presuppose that normative reasons exist 
and that the error theory is false. So, there’s an incoherence in both arguing for error theory and 
accepting it as true. On reflection though, it’s hard to see why this behavior is literally 
incoherent. Suppose that Coraline is trying to convince Leticia to become a vegetarian. Coraline 
knows that Leticia is a utilitarian. Coraline argues that, if you accept utilitarianism, then you 
should give up animal products. But suppose that Coraline actually rejects utilitarianism, and 
accepts some alternative moral theory. There’s no rational error in using premises that your 
interlocutor accepts in order to persuade them of a conclusion that you endorse. Similarly, the 
Buddhist error theorist can rhetorically appeal to premises that her interlocutor accepts—that 
there are reasons—in order to persuade this person that error theory is true. At worst, this 
dialectical approach is disingenuous. It’s not incoherent. 
There’s another interpretation of Arnold’s complaint. Arnold may be arguing that the 
error theory is self-defeating, not incoherent. He suggests this when he writes: “…even if some 
coherent way is found to reduce the deliberate adducing of reasons to the causal processes of our 
sensory interactions with the world, one will…not be able to give reasons that justify him in 
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thinking his beliefs true, so much as explain why he believes them….”24 To explain this 
objection, consider the following two positions: 
(7) It’s true that it’s raining outside. 
(8) There are no reasons to believe that it’s raining outside. 
There seems to be something wrong with the conjunction of these two statements. It’s unclear 
how a rational person could affirm both (7) and (8), as (8) undercuts the grounds for (7). But 
remember that the error theorist is committed to: 
(5) The error theory is true. 
(6) There’s no normative reason to believe the error theory. 
If there’s something wrong with the conjunction of (7) and (8), then it looks like there’s 
something wrong with (5) and (6). Claim (6) undercuts the grounds for accepting (5). In this 
sense, error theory is self-defeating. And presumably critics like Arnold believe that we should 
reject self-defeating positions. 
 How should a Buddhist error theorist respond to this objection? My suggestion is that the 
error theorist should bite the bullet. She should concede that there are, in fact, no reasons to 
endorse error theory while denying that that’s a problem for error theory. Here I’ll draw on the 
work of Jonas Olson.25 Olson points out that we can distinguish between the claim the following 
two claims: 
(9) We have a normative reason to believe the error theory. 
(10) There are arguments that show that the error theory is true.  
An error theorist accepts (10) while rejecting (9). If the Buddhist argument for error theory is 
sound, then there can be no normative reasons, and thus (9) is false. But this argument can still 
show that error theory is true, even though (9) is false.  
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Here’s another way of putting the point. Error theorists don’t deny that epistemic 
instruments exist. They refrain from rejecting the reality of perception, inference, testimony, or 
any other standard epistemic instruments.26 If we use these epistemic instruments in a certain 
way, we’ll learn that the error theory is true. Yet that’s different from saying that we have 
normative reason to believe the error theory. As Olson points out, “the error theorist is offering 
arguments to the effect that the error theory is true. She is not offering arguments to the effect 
that there are epistemic reasons to believe that the error theory is true.”27 
Consider an analogy. Suppose that you’re magically transported back to the year 1500, 
and you’ve brought along a microscope. You want to convince people that our world is covered 
is covered in tiny creatures called bacteria. Here’s what you do. You ask them to observe 
bacteria by looking through the microscope. You also carefully explain to them the evidence and 
logic that supports the existence of bacteria. Your hope is that, if other people observe germs 
with the microscope and follow your chain of reasoning, they’ll realize that bacteria are real. 
And it works. Other people start to believe that bacteria exist. Notice that nothing in this story 
requires you to affirm that people also have normative reasons to accept that bacteria exists. You 
only need to believe that certain epistemic instruments exist that allow people to discern the 
truth, such as perception aided by a microscope. In this way, the error theorist can reject the 
reality of normative reasons while claiming that epistemic instruments, such as inference and 
consistency, allow us to learn the truth that reasons are unreal. There’s no need to claim on top of 
that that we also have normative reasons to believe the error theory. 
Where does this leave us? Arnold indicates that a denial of normative reasons is 
incoherent or self-defeating. Not so. An error theorist only needs to affirm that arguments exist 
that can cause us to see the truth about reasons. It’s hard to see why the Buddhist error theorists 
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should be troubled by the fact that we lack reasons to believe this truth. After all, this is just the 
position that the error theorist defends.  
Arnold sometimes says that, even if the position that reasons are unreal is coherent, it’s 
impossible to believe this position. Arnold argues that “performatively ineliminable features of 
practical reason are constitutively different from theories; as stances that it’s not open to us to 
adopt or not adopt, they cannot be superseded in the way that theoretical commitments can be.”28 
What does “cannot be superseded” mean here? By this, perhaps Arnold means that we’re unable 
to bring ourselves to believe that there are no reasons. Bart Streumer has developed this 
argument in detail.29 Streumer argues for the surprising view that error theory is true and that 
we’re also incapable of believing it. So, some truths are unbelievable. In other words, Streumer’s 
view is that error theory is unbelievable, but that’s no objection to error theory. 
It would, however, be unfortunate if the truth about reality were unbelievable. Perhaps 
this would be especially troubling for Buddhists. This is so because Buddhists draw a close 
connection between believing the truth about reality and ourselves, and liberation. Buddhists 
think that we achieve enlightenment and liberation in part by discarding false beliefs about 
reality, and coming to realize the truth that reality is very different from received opinion. Take 
non-self. The thesis that selves lack reality and that persons are merely convenience designators 
for a collection of psychophysical processes is a radical view. But Buddhists insist that, to 
achieve enlightenment, you must bring yourself to accept non-self. The same goes for other 
Buddhist doctrines, such as the doctrine of emptiness. So, given the close relationship in 
Buddhism between accepting the truth and enlightenment, it would be bad news that we’re 
unable to fully believe the truth about reality. For that reason, it’s worth considering whether the 
error theory is actually unbelievable. 
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 Why should we accept that error theory is unbelievable? The crux of Streumer’s 
argument seems to be this principle: 
Necessary Condition. A person believes that p only if this person does not believe that 
there is no reason to believe that p.30 
If Necessary Condition is true, then you can’t believe some proposition if you also believe that 
you lack any reason to believe this proposition. So, you can’t believe that it’s raining outside 
while believing that you have no reason to believe that it’s raining outside. In the same way, you 
can’t believe the error theory while believing that you have no reason to believe the error theory. 
But, if you believe the error theory, then of course you also believe that you lack any reason for 
believing the error theory. Thus, you can’t believe it. 
 I think that Streumer’s argument is inconclusive. The problem is that Streumer 
sometimes treats Necessary Condition as if it were a conceptual truth about the nature of belief. 
But on my view it’s mostly an empirical question whether someone can come to believe the error 
theory. So, Necessary Condition is vulnerable to counterexamples. At one point, Streumer 
acknowledges this possibility. He says: “Suppose that someone says: ‘I will die tomorrow, but I 
know that there is no reason to believe that I will die tomorrow.’ If this person's belief that he 
will die tomorrow is compulsive, we may think that he can fully believe what he says he 
believes.”31 So, Streumer seems to concede that it’s possible for us to believe propositions 
despite the fact that we believe that have no reason to believe them. If this is true about 
compulsive beliefs, then it’s unclear why it couldn’t be true more generally. For example, 
perhaps a person could come to believe the error theory in an advanced meditative state. Or 
maybe Streumer’s right in that we’re unable to believe the error theory for a long period of time. 
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But perhaps we can believe for some period of time or for a few moments. It’s hard to rule these 
possibilities out if Necessary Condition is ultimately an empirical claim.  
 Streumer could, I suppose, insist that Necessary Condition is a conceptual truth about 
belief. But, in response to this move, it’s open to us to redefine belief. Let’s call Streumer’s 
analysis of belief: BELIEF. Streumer could have his definition of BELIEF. We can then use a 
different notion, belief*, according to which we can believe* p even if we believe* that we lack 
any reason to believe* p. So, on this notion, we can believe* the error theory. It’s then unclear 
why Streumer’s notion of BELIEF is the correct analysis of our intuitive understanding of belief 
in comparison to belief*. As far as I can tell, Streumer neglects to directly argue for the view that 
BELIEF is the correct conceptual analysis of ordinary belief. In the absence of compelling 
arguments to the contrary, we should tentatively conclude that it’s at least possible to believe the 
error theory in some ordinary sense of belief and that there may be cases where this could 
happen in practice. Thus, if the error theory is true, then Buddhist can believe the truth about 
reality, although I concede that it’s probably pretty difficult.  
  
4. Error and Emptiness 
My argument for Buddhist error theory appeals to Abhidharma premises. Abhidharma is 
a philosophical movement in early Buddhism. Ābhidharmikas accepted mereological nihilism 
and most of them seem to have endorsed the causal criterion of reality. These are the premises 
that I’ve used to defend error theory. Abhidharma is also a form of realism. What’s realism? 
Roughly speaking, realism is the view that there’s one true description of the world and that truth 
involves correspondence with how things really are independent of our concepts.32 My argument 
also rests on realist premises because I’ve argued that, from the perspective of our final ontology, 
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there are no normative reasons. But there are other schools of Buddhist thought that reject central 
Abhidharma premises. Are these other schools of thought consistent with error theory? 
I can’t survey all branches of Buddhist philosophy in this paper. I’ll only focus on one of 
the most prominent Buddhist philosophical schools: Mādhyamika. Interpreters notoriously 
disagree about how to understand Mādhyamika philosophy. Here I’ll rely on Mark Siderits’ 
influential interpretation of Mādhyamika.33 According to Siderits, Mādhyamika rejects 
metaphysical realism. Mādhyamikas argue that the idea of ultimate truth is incoherent. They 
conclude that the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth. We’re unable to arrive at a 
description of the world that’s free of all conceptualization. Mādhyamika philosophers deploy 
intricate and fascinating arguments to defend antirealism. I’ll put these to one side for now. I’ll 
merely consider whether Mādhyamika is compatible with error theory. At first glance, the 
answer seems to be “no.” Why? Error theory is a theory about the ultimate truth. It says that the 
ultimate truth is that there are no reasons. Yet Mādhyamikas deny that the idea of ultimate truth 
is coherent. Thus, Mādhyamika’s anti-realism and error theory are inconsistent.  
But, of course, things aren’t that simple. Mādhyamikas do think that certain beliefs are 
better than others in some respects. For example, Mādhyamika philosophers regard antirealism to 
be, in some sense, more justified than realism. How can we make sense of this idea? Siderits 
argues for a kind of epistemic contextualism as an interpretation of Mādhyamika thought. 
Epistemic contextualism holds that truth is relative to the context of inquiry. That is, in a given 
context of inquiry, there’s a truth of the matter. Yet there’s no truth that extends across all 
contexts of inquiry. Here’s an example. Suppose that you ask what my desk is made of, and I 
say: “wood.” That’s a true statement in an ordinary conversational context. But, in another 
context of inquiry, we can give a different answer. In a lecture about the chemical composition of 
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wood, a chemist might point out that my desk is “really” composed of a complex arrangement of 
carbon and oxygen molecules. If we were engaged in a scientific inquiry into the nature of my 
desk, then that would be a true statement. And we can keep going deeper. Perhaps at a more 
fundamental level of analysis my desk is composed of infinitesimal vibrating strings or a series 
of momentary tropes.  
Mādhyamika philosophers believe that the process of analysis can go on forever. There’s 
an infinite number of levels of analysis, and reality never bottoms out in “real” entities that bear 
intrinsic natures. For this reason, it’s false that there are truths that obtain across all contexts of 
inquiry. Nonetheless, Mādhyamikas can make sense of epistemic improvement. Siderits says: “in 
order for this to work and not amount to an ‘anything goes’ relativism, these contexts must be 
seen as falling into a hierarchy, so that each is seen as an improvement on its predecessor.”34 
Siderits’ proposal is that some contexts of inquiry are more fundamental than others, even 
though it’s false that there’s a final level of reality. So, for instance, an analysis that holds that 
persons are a series of psychophysical elements is an improvement over an analysis according to 
which persons have enduring selves, at least in certain contexts of inquiry.  
With these points in mind, let’s return to Buddhist error theory. Mādhyamika would 
reject the suggestion that error theory is a final truth about reality across all contexts of inquiry. 
Suppose that we’re debating first-order ethical questions, like “should I give to charity?” or 
“should I eat animal products?” In the context of answering these questions, we’d likely ignore 
error theory or assume that it’s false. The statement “normative reasons are unreal” isn’t a good 
answer to the question “should I call my mother on her birthday?”35 Yet error theory could be 
true in another context of inquiry. Suppose you’re in a metaethics seminar and someone asks: do 
normative reasons exist? Error theory may be the most plausible answer to this question given 
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the context. In this sense, error theory could be a truth in a context of philosophical inquiry about 
the nature of reasons. So, we can conclude that error theory is compatible with Mādhyamika 
antirealism as long as we qualify error theory in the right way. While Mādhyamikas would deny 
that error theory is an ultimate truth in all contexts, it could be the “truth” in some of them.  
 
5. Conventional Reasons and Buddhist Ethics 
A Buddhist might respond to the case for error theory by conceding that error theory 
represents the ultimate truth. But this Buddhist might argue that normative reasons exist 
conventionally. Buddhists draw a distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, although 
they describe this distinction in different ways. Ultimate truth is about our final ontology. Let’s 
say that a sentence is ultimately true if and only if it corresponds to the facts and neither asserts 
nor presupposes the existence of what is not ultimately real. So, if the arguments for error theory 
are sound, then the statement “there are no normative reasons” is ultimately true in virtue of the 
fact that this statement neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of entities that lack ultimate 
reality. Yet there’s another kind of truth, conventional truth. Many Buddhists believe that moral 
reasons exist at the level of conventional truth. If that’s the case, then error theory is 
conventionally false. 
Is this an objection to error theory? To figure this out, we need to clarify what 
conventional truth involves. What does it mean to say that the error theory is conventionally 
false? The problem with answering this question is that Buddhist philosophers disagree about the 
nature of conventional truth.36 Some Buddhist philosophers characterize conventional truths as 
“statements governed by agreement.” This suggests that a statement is conventionally true if 
everyone (or most) people agree to it. Other Buddhist philosophers imply that conventional and 
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ultimate truths are two different aspects of objects. Some Buddhists regard conventional truth in 
terms of degrees of being. Conventional truths have a lesser degree of existence than do ultimate 
truths. There are various other interpretations of conventional truth as well. So, Buddhists 
disagree about what conventional truth involves. Given this disagreement, how should we 
proceed? In this section, I’ll try to show that, on at least one plausible interpretation of 
conventional truth, error theory is compatible with the conventional existence of normative 
reasons. Here’s my proposal: we can understand conventional truth in fictionalist terms. 
As I’ll use the term here, fictionalism is a thesis about how to interpret a domain of 
discourse. Someone who takes a fictionalist approach to a domain of discourse adopts a pretense 
or make-believe stance towards this domain. The fictionalist says that certain claims in this 
discourse are true or false, but only relative to the fiction. You can claim that “according to the 
relevant fiction, X is true” and you can be right. For example, in Leo Tolstoy’s novella The 
Death of Ivan Ilyich, it’s true that Ivan Ilyich was a judge in nineteenth century Russia, and that 
he died a painful and agonizing death. But Ivan Ilyich never existed. He’s a fictional character 
that Tolstoy invented. Yet there’s a sense in which claims about Ivan Ilyich are truths. They’re 
truths about a fiction. Moreover, the fiction constitutes the truths. Fictions create worlds about 
which we can make true or false claims. 
In an illuminating essay, Jay Garfield argues that conventional truth in Buddhist 
philosophy is fictional truth. He writes: 
Conventional truth is truth in a fiction, a fiction we collectively constitute. Like a novel, 
our collective practices, including our language, our perceptual activities, our thoughts 
and attitudes, constitute a world against and in which truth and falsity can be measured. 
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The standards appropriate to that world are just those that mark off truth and falsity 
within the fiction.37 
As Garfield points out, several Buddhist philosophers seem to understand conventional truth in 
fictionalist terms. This is a possible interpretation of the Prasaṅgika school of Tibetan 
Buddhism.38 The Prasaṅgikas would sometimes suggest that conventional truth is a kind of 
truth—it’s truth “according to the world.” The Prasaṅgikas were Mādhyamika Buddhists. They 
accepted antirealism. So, they thought that reality constitutes a kind of fiction. There’s no truth 
out there that’s free from our conceptualization. If we understand “the world” to constitute a 
fiction, then the typical Prasaṅgika was probably a fictionalist. 
Philosophers draw a distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism. 
Hermeneutic fictionalists believe that fictionalism is an interpretation of actual practice. So, 
when people make claims about the relevant domain of discourse, they in fact intend their claims 
to be interpreted in fictionalist terms. When I say that Ivan Illyich lived badly, I want my 
audience to interpret my claim as a pretense. Everyone knows that Ivan Illyich is a fictional 
character. So, fictionalism about literary characters is an accurate interpretation of actual 
discourse. Revolutionary fictionalists on the other hand say that we ought, in some sense, to treat 
a domain of discourse as a fiction even though most people treat the objects of this domain as 
real. A revolutionary fictionalist about mathematics would say that, while most people treat 
mathematical properties as if they were real entities, we should start viewing mathematical 
properties as useful fictions.  
The typical Prasaṅgika was a revolutionary fictionalist. While conventional truth 
deceives most of us, enlightened beings understand that conventional truths are falsehoods from 
the perspective of ultimate truth. Candrakīrti, who influenced the Prasaṅgika school, writes along 
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these lines that the enlightened “who have abandoned afflictive ignorance, compounded 
phenomena, which are seen to be like reflections have the nature of being created; but these are 
not truths for them because they are not fixated on things as true.”39 In what sense is 
conventional truth deceptive? Conventional truth is deceptive because conventional truths 
present to us if they were real. We think that there are entities that bear their own intrinsic nature 
out there in the world. But that’s misleading. According to the Mādhyamikas, there are no real 
entities with intrinsic natures. We achieve greater understanding by realizing that conventional 
truths are mere fictions. Thus, the Prasaṅgikas thought that viewing conventional truths as a kind 
of fiction represents intellectual progress. 
So, it’s plausible that one prominent interpretation of conventional truth is fictionalism. 
Buddhists in the Mādhyamika tradition often claim that the only kind of truth is conventional 
truth. If we understand conventional truths as fictional truths, then it follows that Mādhyamikas 
must be global fictionalists, fictionalists about all of reality. Here I only want to consider a local 
version of fictionalism: fictionalism about normative reasons. To illustrate how this works, 
notice that we can express truths about the reasons that characters have in fictions. Consider 
again The Death of Ivan Ilyich. Near the end of his life, Ivan Ilyich realizes that he had lived 
badly. Ilyich has spent his life devoted to advancing his career, making money, boosting his 
social status and reputation, and accumulating possessions. The rest of elite Russian society 
approves of Ilyich’s way of life. Yet most of Ilyich’s relationships are shallow and dysfunctional. 
His wife and children despise him, and his friends resent having to attend his wake. Ilyich 
acknowledges as much near the end: 
It occurred to [Ivan Ilyich] that what had formerly appeared completely impossible to 
him, that he had not lived his life as he should have, might be true... His work, and his 
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living conditions, and his family, and these social and professional interests—all might 
have been not right. He tried to defend it all to himself. And he suddenly felt all the 
weakness of what he was defending. And there was nothing to defend.40 
Here’s my judgment: Ivan Ilyich had reasons to live his life differently than he did. Ilyich should 
have cared less about himself, and more about the lives of others. If Ilyich had been more 
altruistic, then he would have lived a better life, and he had good reason to live a better life. 
Again, these claims seem true, even though both Ilyich and his reasons are fictions.  
 Fictionalists about normative reasons say that all reasons are like this. They’re fictional 
entities, but claims about them are true or false from the perspective of the fiction. Error theory 
and fictionalism seem compatible. Remember that error theory is a claim about the ultimate 
truth. It says that there are no normative reasons in our final ontology. Fictionalists can agree, 
and they treat reasons as existing only “according to the world”—that is, according to a 
perspective contaminated by our cognitive limitations, interests, and conceptualizations. Error 
theory is conventionally false if fictionalism about reasons is true. But, from a perspective 
external to the fiction, error theory represents the ultimate truth. Therefore, if conventional truth 
is fictional truth, then conventional truth is consistent with error theory. 
However, if error theory is ultimately true and conventional truth is merely fictional, this 
raises another problem. Is my account compatible with Buddhist ethics? Buddhism has a rich 
ethical tradition. Buddhists generally insist on the importance of compassion and loving-kindness 
for all sentient beings, and condemn killing in almost all circumstances. Buddhism begins with 
the reality of suffering (dukkha) and is premised on the idea that we have reason to avoid this 
suffering. Furthermore, Buddhists often present Buddhism as a set of universal truths. Everyone 
should exercise compassion for sentient beings, and everyone has reason to escape the cycle of 
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suffering. If normative truths are fictional, must we also jettison Buddhism’s ethical 
aspirations?41 
 This is a tough question that I can only briefly explore here. Here’s what my account 
seems to imply for Buddhist ethics. If error theory is true, then there can be no normative reasons 
to adopt any specific fictions. There can only be descriptive reasons or explanations for why we 
adopt certain fictions rather others. In this respect, I agree with Bronwyn Finnigan and Koji 
Tanaka that Buddhist philosophy lacks the resources to justify fundamental moral precepts.42 
Nonetheless, I’m more optimistic than Finnigan and Tanaka about the prospect of justifying 
Buddhist ethics after we’ve adopted some core and nearly universal fictions about normative 
reasons. Let me conclude this section by illustrating how this is possible.  
According to my version of fictionalism, we tell ourselves a story according to which we 
have reasons for action, belief, and attitudes. Where does this story come from? The explanation 
is complex. Evolutionary, social, and personal factors likely all play a role in explaining the 
content of our story about reasons. Sharon Street asks us to compare evaluative claims that are 
nearly universal across humans to the range of possible evaluative claims. Consider:43 
(11) The fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason to do it. 
(12) The fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason not to do it. 
Or: 
(13) The fact that something would help one’s child is a reason to do it. 
(14) The fact that something would help one’s child is a reason not to do it. 
Almost everyone accepts (11) and (13), while few accept (12) and (14). Why? Street appeals to 
evolutionary biology for an explanation. We evolved in a way that makes (11) and (13) much 
more plausible to us than (12) and (14). More specifically, we evolved with dispositions that 
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favor our survival and reproduction, which includes the disposition to affirm that we have 
reasons to survive and to benefit our offspring. There’s surely more to the story than just 
evolution. Cultural forces and other factors also shape our views about which reasons we have. 
But let’s suppose that Street is right that, because of our common evolutionary heritage, humans 
share a large set of convictions about their reasons. So, we can expect people to adopt common 
and overlapping fictions about what reasons they have.  
 Once we’ve adopted a set of fictional reasons, we start trying to make them coherent with 
one another. Our beliefs are rarely perfectly consistent with one another in part because we have 
so many of them. We might hold two potentially conflicting beliefs like “it’s wrong for me to 
cause animals to suffer and die” and “it’s permissible for me to consume animal products from 
factory farms.” In the process of making our beliefs about our reasons consistent, the content of 
our beliefs can change quite a lot.  
We’re also often wrong about the non-normative facts. Correcting these mistakes can 
change our understanding of how we should behave, even holding our values fixed. The most 
prominent example of this in Buddhism is the belief in the self. Buddhists argue that, if there’s 
no self, then altruism is rationally required. Most of us think that we should minimize our own 
suffering. But we also think that we’re enduring and independent entities, and that this fact 
justifies prioritizing our own suffering more than the suffering of others. Yet, if this belief in the 
self is false, then we should minimize suffering regardless of its location.44 If this argument 
succeeds, then a non-normative mistake (the belief in a self) can change how we ought to treat 
others. So, a fictionalist account of reasons leaves room for moral progress if we’re capable of 
subjecting our fundamental values and non-normative beliefs to widely-accepted epistemic 
standards, such as standards of coherence and empirical observation.45 
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With this sketch on the table, Buddhists can now make the following case. They can 
argue that Buddhist moral principles are included in the maximally coherent set of moral beliefs 
that are also consistent with our best knowledge of the non-normative facts. So, it’s true that 
there are only descriptive reasons why we’ve adopted certain core convictions about our reasons. 
Following Street, perhaps our values have an evolutionary explanation. Nonetheless, given that 
most of us have adopted a common set of fictions, Buddhist values and principles are still in the 
running for the truth relative to these fictions. I’ve obviously done nothing to show that Buddhist 
ethics is in fact included in our maximally coherent set of beliefs. To show this, we’d need to 
engage in an enormous amount of first-order ethical reasoning. I only claim that it’s possible that 
Buddhist ethical principles and values are included in most people’s ideally coherent set of 
beliefs, and that this possibility is consistent with the fictionalist account that I’ve described. 
But what about universalism? Recall that many Buddhists think that Buddhism describes 
a set of universal truths about what we have reason to do and believe. It’s hard to see how 
fictionalism is entirely consistent with universalism. Although we might expect most people to 
assume a common set of core fictions about their reasons, this probably won’t not be true for 
everyone. Some people will reject our fictions, and endorse different ones. If some people reject 
foundational premises in the overall case for Buddhist values and principles, it seems unlikely 
that there’s anything Buddhists can say to convince these people of the truth of Buddhist views.  
If these reflections are correct, then the Buddhist aspiration for universalism may be 
frustrated. Perhaps though we should question the motivation behind this universalistic 
aspiration. The desire to show that everyone is committed to the same set of ethical and 
prudential truths may represent a kind of clinging. One of Buddhism’s central insights is that 
clinging generates suffering. In particular, clinging to the self is among the greatest sources of 
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suffering. We should overcome desire and attachment because these psychological states 
perpetuate the false belief in the self. Yet the desire to show that certain values or moral 
principles are universal truths could be a subtle kind of self-assertion. This form of clinging is 
expressed when we pound the table and claim that “X just is the correct, mind-independent moral 
principle that all rational beings must accept.” This table-pounding suggests an insidious kind of 
grasping and that we’ve become possessive of our own ethical views. The insight that normative 
reasons are mere fictions could help us to overcome clinging and attachments to our beliefs. We 
can come to see our moral beliefs as truths, but truths relative to a fiction that not everyone 
accepts. This realization may weaken our grasping and possessive attitudes toward our 
convictions and thereby help undermine our sense of self. So, like other Buddhist doctrines, 
perhaps fictionalism about normative reasons can have a soteriological point.46 
 
6. Conclusion 
Critics have long objected to Buddhism on the grounds that it’s nihilistic. This 
understanding of Buddhism has lasted until modern times. Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, 
thought Buddhists were “passive nihilists.”47 If we view error theory as a kind of nihilism, then 
I’ve argued that Buddhist philosophers should bite the bullet. Core Buddhist commitments entail 
error theory about normative reasons. But the news isn’t all bad. It turns out that Buddhist error 
theory is a surprisingly compelling position. To show this, I’ve argued that Buddhist error theory 
can overcome both common objections to error theory in general and the objection that error 
theory is incompatible with central Buddhist doctrines and aims. Buddhists are notorious for 
denying things that most other people affirm, such the self, composite entities, universals, and 
the idea that there’s a way that the world is really like independent of our concepts. My 
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arguments in this paper suggest that Buddhists should deny another set of entities that everyone 
else accepts: reasons. 
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